Practice Review
This practice review critically examines the intersection of embodied memory, embodied cognition, and improvisational dance within a Practice-as-Research framework. The project explores how solo improvisation generates knowledge not through external choreographic planning but through the body's interactions with memory, perception, and sensation. Drawing on Connerton's theory of incorporated memory and Varela et al.'s model of enactive cognition, the review demonstrates how the body operates as both a site of knowledge storage and a method of inquiry. In this review, I integrate these theoretical perspectives with the insights generated through my improvisational tasks. By positioning the body as both a site of memory and a method of cognitive inquiry, I demonstrate how my practical work is not separate from theory but continuously reshapes and extends it. This integration positions improvisation not as expressive output but as a dynamic process of embodied thinking and remembering.
Theoretical Foundations
This research draws on two key theoretical frameworks: Paul Connerton’s concept of embodied memory and the theory of embodied and enactive cognition developed by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch. Connerton distinguishes between "inscribed memory" (texts, archives) and "incorporated memory," which is enacted through gesture, posture, and rhythm, highlighting how bodily habits encode cultural and experiential knowledge. He states, "In habitual memory... the past is sedimented in the body" (Connerton, 1989). This framework informed my approach to improvisational tasks, particularly body mapping, where my arms and chest responded spontaneously through curved and circular movements rooted in my training in Chinese folk and classical dance. These responses emerged without conscious planning but were activated through bodily repetition and spatial triggers, illustrating Connerton’s notion of involuntary memory driven by embodied sensation and environmental cues (Connerton, 1989).
Importantly, the purpose of this review is not to reinforce, prove, or disprove Connerton's or others' ideas. Instead, I situate my research within a wider context of embodied knowledge scholarship and practice, drawing connections between theory and personal improvisational experience. By integrating theoretical perspectives and practice-based tasks, I demonstrate how my work not only builds on but also extends these frameworks, focusing on how embodied memory is activated and reorganised through specific improvisational strategies. My interpretation acknowledges that embodied memory is not universal but emerges through my unique movement history and sensory engagement during improvisation. Recent research has further highlighted how improvisational tasks can deepen dancers' self-awareness and activate embodied memories through dynamic interaction with the environment (Morejón, 2021).
To explore improvisation as a cognitive process, I draw on Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's enactive cognition theory, which emphasises that cognition arises from dynamic interactions between body, environment, and perception rather than from pre-planned mental acts. They propose that "cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela et al., 1991). This perspective clarified my experiences during the sensory reset improvisation task, where dancing with my eyes closed led to decision-making guided by tactile, auditory, and proprioceptive feedback instead of conscious reasoning. The body was not merely executing a sequence but was negotiating, adjusting, and generating movement moment by moment. This highlights how embodied cognition functions as an active, perceptual process embedded in practice, not as an abstract concept. Moreover, Lindberg et al. (2023, p. 334) emphasise that improvisational dance not only reveals embodied cognition in action but also serves as a tool for exploring embodied meaning-making and adaptive learning.
These frameworks have, therefore, shaped both the design of my practice tasks and my interpretation of improvisation as a method of embodied inquiry. By positioning the body as both a living archive of memory and an active agent of knowledge production, my research contributes to ongoing discussions in dance studies, embodied cognition, and practice-as-research, where theory and practice are not separate but co-constitutive.
Case practice research
Building on these theories, I turned to key practitioners whose methods shaped my understanding of movement generation, memory, and perception.
Steve Paxton – Contact Improvisation
Paxton emphasized how movement emerges from real-time negotiation with gravity, inertia, and another body (Paxton, 1975). While Contact Improvisation centers on partner interaction, my work focuses on the solo improviser’s negotiation with environmental and internal cues, extending Paxton’s concepts to explore cognitive processes activated during independent movement.
Deborah Hay – My Body, the Archive
Hay’s assertion that "the body is the archive" (Hay, 2018) informed my approach to disrupting habitual movement. By questioning and reconfiguring gestures from my dance training, I explored how embodied memory can be transformed, aligning with Hay’s emphasis on continual questioning and present attention (Hay, 2018).
Lisa Nelson – Tuning Scores
Nelson’s practice shifts improvisation from action to perception, asking, "What am I perceiving right now?" (Nelson, 2005). This resonated with my sensory reset task, where movement arose from attention to sound, weight, and emotion. My focus extended her ideas by investigating how a solo improviser negotiates memory and perception without external cues.
Through the analysis of Paxton, Hay, and Nelson’s improvisational practices, I established the theoretical and practical basis for my research. Their emphasis on movement arising from perception, memory, and attention shaped my practical tasks, including sensory reset, memory-triggered improvisation, and memory fragment collage.
Unlike these practitioners, who focus on partner-based or score-driven improvisation, my research addresses the solo dancer’s navigation of memory and cognition without external cues. By focusing on the body’s internal negotiation with its history, sensation, and environment, I propose a view of the solo improvising body as an active cognitive field. This approach contributes to their legacy while raising new questions about how embodied memory and cognition generate knowledge in unstructured movement. My research invites further discussion of improvisation’s epistemological potential as embodied inquiry.